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There are significant differences of opinion about the legal rights
of detainees and the legal responsibilities of detaining authorities in
the so-called war on terror. Some reflect reasonable differences among
reasonable people; others reflect catastrophic errors of judgment and
bad faith efforts to obscure the true content of applicable law. Many of
these differences of opinion would dissolve if we could eliminate the
kind of willful ignorance that the legendary American journalist H.L.
Mencken no doubt had in mind when he observed that for every
complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong.
Detention in the context of counterterrorism is, indeed, a complex
issue with many moving parts, both large and small. Before diving
into the details, I would like to offer some historical background on
the major issues.
MOVING PART 1: INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
World War II gave us the Age of Rights.' Immediately after that
conflict, the United Nations was born and the first three major items
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1. Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990). Henkin, often acknowledged as
the father of modern human rights law, used the phrase "Age of Rights" to describe
the increasing emphasis of international law on the rights of individuals in the post-
war period.
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on its agenda were a Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a
Convention against Genocide, and a proposal for an international
criminal court. A long list of international human rights treaties
followed. Regional human rights enforcement mechanisms were
established in Europe, the Americas, and now, in Africa.
MOVING PART 2: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
A hundred years before the dawn of the Age of Rights, limits on
the means and methods of warfare and rules for the treatment of
armed conflict detainees began to find their way into international
treaties, most famously, the various Hague Conventions and the
Geneva Conventions of 1864. The law of armed conflict, also known
as the law of war or international humanitarian law (IHL), is related
to, but separate from, human rights law.
MOVING PART 3: A SHIFT IN FOCUS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM
STATE-TO-STATE TO STATE-TO-INDIVIDUAL RELATIONS
Human rights law and humanitarian law have common
characteristics. They are both aspects of international law, a body of
law that began to take shape many hundreds of years ago to bring
order to international relationships, especially in war. But unlike
international law, with its state-to-state underpinnings, IHL and
human rights law are also designed to protect individuals, and in
particular, to govern the state-to-individual relationship.
MOVING PART 4: SOVEREIGNTY
The idea that the world should be divided into sovereign states is
not a reflection of any natural law-it just happened that way. And as
long as international law was limited to the regulation of relations
between states, it impinged little upon the prerogatives of state
sovereignty. But once international law began to instruct states on
appropriate conduct towards individuals, especially towards
individuals within its own borders, the tension between sovereignty
and international law began to mount. Thus, cynical observers have
noted that IHL is at the vanishing point of international law and
international law is at the vanishing point of law.
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MOVING PARTS 5, 6, AND 7: A SHIFT IN THE NATURE OF THE
RELATIONSHIP AMONG LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL
POWER IN THE UNITED STATES
Everyone knows about the balance of powers established among
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, reflected in Articles I,
II, and III of the U.S. Constitution. The ordering of the three branches
(legislative, executive, and judicial) was not random. The founders
planted the sovereign power of the legislature to make law in the first
Article.2 Today, casual observers may assume that the importance and
power of the legislative and executive branches are reversed, because
for the last quarter century, and especially during the Bush
Administration, the executive has been increasingly elbowing its way
into the territory of an increasingly pliant Congress. 3 The same
executive, despite its lip service to Tenth Amendment visions of
federalism (the reservation to the several states of the powers not
ceded to the federal government), has also had remarkable success in
populating the third branch, the federal courts, with judges who are
enthusiastic foot soldiers in the "executive power" militia.
Human rights law, humanitarian law, the increasing focus of
international law on state-to-individual relations, the pressures this
places on traditional notions of state sovereignty, and finally, the
shifting nature of the relationship among legislative, executive, and
judicial power in the United States provide context to the violations of
international law committed by the United States in the war on terror.
These violations take three forms: treatment of detainees, right to
challenge detention, and trial of detainees.
DETAINEE TREATMENT
The war on terror has given us the ultimate brush-off of
international law, most notoriously in the so-called torture memos.
You may recall that these memos, written by Professor John Yoo and
Judge Jay Bybee, sycophantically informed the President that he had
the power to ignore international law in the service of his personal
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
3. CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2008).
2008]
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vision of national security.4 The memos essentially allow the President
to torture people when he thinks it is necessary, despite the fact that
the ban on torture is one of the most well-established prohibitions in
international law. Out of this blank check philosophy came the
President's Memorandum of February 7, 2002, most notable for its
incontrovertibly false conclusion, later nixed by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,5 that Al Qaeda prisoners are not
covered by the laws of war.6 What is so heartbreakingly less noted
about this memo is its shocking conclusion that there exists a category
of individuals who are not legally entitled to humane treatment.
The memo also takes liberty with long-standing notions of the
laws of war concerning the distinction between the two branches of
that body of law: rules for the conduct of hostilities and rules for
treatment of persons in the power of the enemy, including detainees.
During the conduct of hostilities, enemies may be targeted consistent
with the principle of military necessity, which is that which
contributes to the military mission. However, considerations of
military necessity in rules relating to conduct of hostilities have no
place in questions concerning the obligations of detaining authorities
to detainees, who must always be treated humanely. Nevertheless, the
President says the policy (not the legal obligation, the existence of
which he denies) of humane treatment will apply only "to the extent
appropriate and consistent with military necessity."7
4. Judge Bybee may have been one of the first to suggest that an act is not
torture unless the pain inflicted is "equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying
serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even
death." Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-40A (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.humanrights
first.org/us-law/etn/gonzales/memos-dir/memo_20020801JD_%20Gonz_.pdf.
Similarly, Professor Yoo suggested that U.S. obligations under the Convention
Against Torture would not prevent the use of certain tortuous interrogation methods
against "captured al Qaeda operatives." Letter from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant
Att'y Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002),
available at http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/doj/ bybee80102ltr.html.
5. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
6. Memorandum for the Vice President et al., Humane Treatment of al Qaeda
and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
uslaw/etn/gonzales/memosdir/dir_20020207_BushDet.pdf.
7. Id.
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If you do not think these claims are so disturbing, then wait until
you hear why the United States is throwing international law
overboard. It is not in defense of national security. Early on in the war
in Afghanistan, the United States became frustrated at how little
actionable intelligence it received on the Taliban and especially on Al
Qaeda. No wonder, given the reliance on technology in both the
fighting and intelligence-gathering effort and the lack of human
penetration into the places where information lay.
Consequently, the pressure for good information was ratcheted up
in the realm of detention. Two tragically misbegotten tactics that were
guaranteed to backfire emerged as a result of this pressure. First, the
United States effectively decided to outsource the decision of whom to
detain to the many-factioned Afghan population. By littering the
countryside with leaflets offering huge bounties for the capture of "Al-
Qaida and Taliban murderers," the United States assured itself that it
would be provided with large numbers of innocents turned in purely
for financial gain.
8
8. See Mark Denbeaux et al., Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A Profile of
517 Detainees Through Analysis of Department of Defense Data 23-25 (2006),
available at http://law.shu.edu/news/guantanamo-report-final-20806.pdf.
2008] 139
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Psychological Operations (PsyOp)
Leaflet No. TF1 1-RP09-1
GET WEALTH AND
POWER BEYOND
YOUR DREAMS -
HELP THE ANTI-
TALIBAN FORCE
RID AFGHANISTAN
OF MURDERERS
AND TERRORISTS
FRONT
"Get wealth and power beyond your dreams.
Help the Anti-Taliban Gorces rid Afghanistan
of murderers and terrorists"
YOU CAN RECEIVE MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
FOR HELPING THE ANTI-TAILBAN FORCE
CATCH AL-QAIDA AND TALIBAN MURDERERS
THIS IS ENOUGH MONEY TO TAKE CARE OF
YOUR FAMILY, YOUR VILLAGE, YOUR TRIBE
FOR THE REST OF YOUR LIFE -
PAY FOR LIVESTOCK AND DOCTORS
AND SCHOOL BOOKS AND HOUSING FOR
ALL YOUR PEOPLE
t ........ " :*:: - --'" -........ --"
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This, in turn, resulted in the detention of large numbers of persons
with little or no intelligence value. 9  For obvious reasons,
interrogations of this population proved frustrating. But rather than
conclude that further interrogations would reap diminishing returns,
detaining authorities decided to increase the pressure on detainees to
talk. Thus began the second misbegotten tactic: the move to
"enhanced interrogation techniques"-a euphemism for torture. 10
At this point, there should no longer be any need to prove that
detainees were systematically tortured, despite the President's hollow
mantra that "we do not torture."" However, denials of abuse persist.
Several administration supporters have made the obligatory half-day
personal visit to Guantanamo in their "investigation" of alleged abuses
and pronounced the conditions there humane. 12 For this reason, it
remains necessary to recount the evidence. Here is an account of
detainee treatment at Guantanamo from an FBI agent:
On a couple of occasions, I entered interview rooms to find a
detainee chained hand and foot in a fetal position to the floor, with
no chair, food, or water. Most times they had urinated or defecated
on themselves, and had been left there for 18, 24 hours or more. On
one occasion, the air conditioning had been turned down so far and
the temperature was so cold in the room that the barefooted
detainee was shaking with cold. When I asked the MP's [sic] what
9. See id. at 21-22. For example, many Chinese Uighur detainees have been
cleared for release from Guantanamo, following the government's failure to provide
any evidence of their connection to the Taliban, Al Qaeda, or any entity hostile to
the United States. Id.; see also William Glaberson, Judge Orders 17 Detainees at
Guant6namo Freed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/O8/washington/O8detain.html. These Uighur men
are reported to have been sold into detention by bounty-seekers for $5000 per head.
The 7:30 Report: Chinese Muslims Stuck in Guantanamo Limbo (Australian Broad.
Corp. broadcast Jan. 17, 2006), available at http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/conten/
2006/si 549632.htm.
10. See, e.g., Hearing on Annual Worldwide Threat Assessment Before the S.
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 110th Cong. 24 (2008) (statement of General Michael
Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency), available at http://www.dni.gov/
testimonies/20080205_transcript.pdf.
11. Bush: "We Do Not Torture" Terror Suspects, MSNBC, Nov. 7, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9956644.
12. David D. Kirkpatrick, Senators Laud Treatment of Detainees in
Guantdnamo, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2005/06/28/politics/28gitmo.html.
2008]
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was going on, I was told that interrogators from the day prior had
ordered this treatment, and the detainee was not to be moved. On
another occasion, the A/C had been turned off, making the
temperature in the unventilated room probably well over 100
degrees. The detainee was almost unconscious on the floor, with a
pile of hair next to him. He had apparently been literally pulling his
own hair out throughout the night. On another occasion, not only
was the temperature unbearably hot, but extremely loud rap music
was being played in the room, and had been since the day before,
with the detainee chained hand and foot in the fetal position on the
tile floor. '
3
Getting no information or bad information and making enemies of
the very people the United States needed to befriend were not the only
consequences of these practices. A number of CIA interrogators
became increasingly concerned about the risk of following orders to
commit war crimes. ' 4 These interrogators were rightly concerned that
their conduct could subject them to prosecution, either during this
administration as scapegoats or in the future. Absent legal cover, the
interrogators made their fears known and balked at torture.
The solution to this problem was obvious: issue legal memos from
the Department of Justice confirming the President's authority to
order torture. The purpose of these memos was not to justify an
effective program, or even an ineffective program, but rather, to
provide legal cover for worried interrogators. "If DoJ says it's legal,
then even if they are wrong, I'm not guilty of a war crime since I have
13. CENTER FOR THE STUDIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS,
TESTIMONIES OF FBI AGENTS 3, http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/projects/the-
guantanamo-testimonials-project/testimonies/testimonies-of-fbi-agents. "In response
to a Freedom of Information Act request filed by the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) on October 7, 2003, the United States Government released
documents detailing abuse of detainees held oversees. The documents filled more
than 100,000 pages, many of them heavily redacted." Id. at 1; see also Josh Meyer,
FBI Works to Bolster Cases on Al Qaeda, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2007, at Al,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2007/oct/21/nation/na-terror21 ("'Those guys
were using techniques that we didn't even want to be in the room for,' one senior
federal law enforcement official said. 'The CIA determined they were going to
torture people, and we made the decision not to be involved."').
14. Joby Warrick, CIA Tactics Endorsed in Secret Memos, WASH. POST, Oct.
15, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/10/14/AR2008101403331 .html.
8
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the defense of justifiable reliance on legal advice." So if you read
these memos and react with a "This is shocking! How can they say
this?" you have missed the point. The authors' mission was
accomplished, not by being correct, but simply by being.
The President's February 7, 2002, memo provided interrogators a
second layer of insurance by denying that the Geneva Conventions
applied to the detainees.' 5 The U.S. War Crimes Act generally applies
only to violations against persons protected by the Geneva
Conventions. 16 Thus, if the victims are not protected by the
Conventions, then the perpetrators are not guilty of war crimes, even
if their techniques amount to torture! It is that simple.
Are these the sullen musings of a human rights advocate trying to
attribute the worst possible motives to our leaders on mere
speculation? No. Denying application of the Geneva Conventions to
Guantanamo detainees in order to shield U.S. interrogators from war
crimes liability is an unabashedly explicit motive, articulated in the
advice given to the President just prior to the issuance of his February
7 memo.17
This is the purpose of the torture memos. This is the imperative
for which 50 years of commitment to international human rights, 150
years of commitment to the international laws of war, and 200 years
of commitment to the constitutional balance of powers were cast
aside. The United States must retreat from the attractive nuisance that
Mencken warned of: embracing simple solutions to complex
problems. It is true that Al Qaeda detainees are not entitled to Prisoner
of War (POW) status and it may be the case that Taliban detainees are
also not entitled to POW status.' 8 But that is a far stretch from the
15. Memorandum for the Vice President et al., supra note 6 ("[N]one of the
provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or
elsewhere throughout the world .. ").
16. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d) (2006).
17. See, e.g., Letter from John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen., to President George W.
Bush (Feb. 1, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docsftorturel
jash201021tr.html ("Thus, a Presidential determination against treaty applicability
would provide the highest assurance that no court would subsequently entertain
charges that American military officers, intelligence officials, or law enforcement
officials violated Geneva Convention rules relating to field conduct, detention
conduct or interrogation of detainees. The War Crimes Act of 1996 makes violation
of parts of the Geneva Convention a crime in the United States.").
18. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art.
2008]
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government's assertions that none of the laws of war or rules of
human rights law apply to them.
In fact, there are three applicable and overlapping legal
frameworks: IHL, international human rights law, and domestic law.
All three legal frameworks apply to some extent in armed conflict.
Within IHL, there is one set of rules for international armed conflict
(IAC) and another, less comprehensive set for non-international armed
conflict (NIAC). 19 Consequently, there is greater application of human
rights and domestic law in NIAC than in IAC situations. In non-armed
conflict, IHL does not apply-only international human rights and
domestic law apply.
War on terror detainees must be properly qualified into these
categories to determine what rights they have to challenge detention
and whether they are to face trials. But to determine what kind of
4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3116, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 for the criteria for POW status.
19. Common Article 2 of the four Geneva Conventions (so-called because it is
found in all four Conventions) governs international armed conflict-armed conflict
between two or more parties to the Conventions. Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the
Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva
Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea art. 2, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention]. Only one article, Common Article 3, addresses NIAC. First Geneva
Convention, supra, art. 3; Second Geneva Convention, supra, art. 3; Third Geneva
Convention, supra, art. 3; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra, art. 3. See also
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977,
16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) (entered into force Dec. 7, 1979) [hereinafter Protocol I]
(comprised of 102 articles and two annexes); Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1442, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609 (1977) (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol II]
(comprised of twenty-eight articles and no annexes). "Although the U.S. is not party
to Additional Protocol I, important segments of the Additional Protocol are widely
regarded as customary international law." Gabor Rona, Legal Issues in the "War on
Terrorism "-Reflecting on the Conversation between Silja N. U. Voneky and John
Bellinger, 9 GERMAN L.J. 711, 729 n.69 (2008), available at http://www.germanlaw
journal.com/print.php?id=963.
10
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treatment they are entitled to, detainees do not need to be pigeonholed
at all. The legal frameworks are unanimous: all detainees are entitled
to be treated humanely and no one falls between the cracks because
there are no cracks. To get its way with detainees, the United States
has run roughshod over the delicate fabric of international law. The
United States claims the prerogatives of the laws of war even when it
is not war, as evidenced by its literal use of the term war on terror and
20overly broad definition of enemy combatant.
As stated in the President's memo, when the United States is at
war, it claims the detainees are not covered by the law even though
they are. 2' The United States also stakes out a lonely position that
22human rights law does not apply to its actions abroad. The
extraterritorial application of human rights obligations is accepted by
a broad spectrum and an overwhelming majority of international
jurisprudence and scholarship.23  By ignoring the weight of
20. U.S. District Judge Joyce Hens Green questions whether the term enemy
combatant "cover[s] (and thus, permit[s] detention of) a little old lady in Switzerland
who writes checks to what she thinks is a charity that helps orphans in Afghanistan
but really is a front to finance al-Qaeda activities." Rona, supra note 19, at 727
(citing In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C. 2005).
"'She could,' replied Deputy Associate Attorney General Brian Boyle. 'Someone's
intention is clearly not a factor that would disable detention."' Id. (citing
Government Argues for Holding Detainees, MSNBC, Dec. 1, 2004,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6631668/). "Judge Green objected to such an
expansive definition of enemy combatant which includes 'individuals who never
committed a belligerent act or who never directly supported hostilities against the
U.S. or its allies."' Id. (citing In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at
475).
21. Memorandum for the Vice President et al., supra note 6.
22. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human
Rights Committee: United States of America, 284, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50,
A/50/40 (Apr. 6, 1995) ('The Committee does not share the view expressed by the
Government that the Covenant lacks extraterritorial reach under all circumstances.
Such a view is contrary to the consistent interpretation of the Committee on this
subject, that, in special circumstances, persons may fall under the subject-matter
jurisdiction of a State party even when outside that State's territory.").
23. Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions recognizes the applicability of
international human rights law in armed conflict: "[r]ecalling furthermore that
international instruments relating to human rights offer a basic protection to the
human person ...." Protocol H1, supra note 19, at preamble. Similarly, several
international authorities on human rights support the continued application of human
rights law in armed conflict: these include the International Court of Justice, the
2008]
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international authority, actions such as enforced disappearance of
persons into secret CIA detention camps and extrajudicial rendition of
such individuals to countries notorious for torture become legal in the
U.S. lexicon of international law. Human rights advocates welcomed
the Hamdan Court's conclusion that Common Article 3 (CA 3) of the
Geneva Conventions 24 requires humane treatment of detainees and did
indeed apply to all Al Qaeda detainees.25 It would have been better
had the Court added that human rights treaty obligations, namely the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights26 and the Torture
Convention,27 require no less, thus ending the pretense that human
rights law does not apply in war or beyond U.S. borders.
But even had the Court done so, the United States has a ready-to-
wear fallback position. Whether or not human rights law applies, and
even though CA 3 has been deemed to apply, the CIA's so-called
enhanced interrogation techniques, including waterboarding, short
shackling, extreme temperatures, sensory deprivation, isolation, use of
dogs, and sleep deprivation, are all legal, according to official U.S.
Human Rights Committee, the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights. See Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8); Legal Consequences
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9); U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment
No. 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), 3, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/21/Rev. 1/Add. 11
(Aug. 31, 2001); U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31: The
Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. I/Add. 13 (Mar. 29, 2004); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council,
Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Israel, E/C. 12/1/Add.69 (Aug. 31, 2001); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No.
IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 183 (Dec. 10, 1998); Coard v. United States, Case
10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99, OEA/Ser.L.V/I. 106, doc. 6 rev. 38
(1999).
24. First Geneva Convention, supra note 19, art 3; Second Geneva Convention,
supra note 19, art. 3; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 19, art. 3; Fourth
Geneva Convention, supra note 19, art. 3.
25. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629-32 (2006).
26. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16,
1966).
27. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10,
1984).
12
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doctrine. These techniques are legal because cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment (CID) that falls short of torture (as these methods
do, according to administration doctrine) is understood to encompass
only conduct that violates the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.2
8
Well, what is wrong with that? What is wrong is that the
Fourteenth Amendment has no application to the conduct of federal
authorities; the Eighth Amendment has no application to abuse that is
not "punishment" (as in being sentenced to a whipping following a
criminal conviction); and the Fifth Amendment prohibition against
abuse of detainees is fluid, triggered only by conduct that "shocks the
conscience. ' ,29 The government may assert that although pumping adrug suspect's stomach may shock the conscience, 30 none of its
28. The Torture Convention prohibits both torture and "other acts of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture." Id.
part 1, art. 16. The United States made a reservation when ratifying the Torture
Convention, stating that it understood the phrase "cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment" to mean conduct prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Committee
Against Torture: Declarations and Reservations, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/
6/cat/treades/convention-reserv.htm.
29. The Eighth Amendment bans cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII. The Fifth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Rochin
v. California, bans official conduct that "shocks the conscience." 342 U.S. 165, 172
(1953). The Fourteenth Amendment applies these two Amendments to the states.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Professor David Luban explains that "[the Justice
Department's Office of Legal Counsel] loopholed this definition of CID in two
ways. First, it seized on the fact that the [Supreme] Court has held that the Fifth and
Eighth Amendments apply only within U.S. territory. Ergo, nothing outside U.S.
territory can possibly count as CID." Posting of David Luban to Balkinization,
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/10/were-you-really-surprised.html (Oct. 5, 2007,
11:23 EST). The second loophole stems from the government's misguided
interpretation of the Supreme Court's statement that the "shocks the conscience"
standard applies to "'only the most egregious conduct,' such as 'conduct intended to
injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest."' Id. (citing to Letter
from William E. Moschella, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Patrick J. Leahy, U.S. Senator
(Apr. 4, 2005), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/
archives/CAT%20Article%2016.Leahy-Feinstein-Feingold%20Letters.pdf).
"Obviously, [in the government's view] interrogation of detainees is justifiable by a
government interest. If so, it doesn't shock the conscience, doesn't violate the Fifth
Amendment, and therefore doesn't count as cruel, inhuman or degrading." Posting
of David Luban to Balkinization, supra.
30. The "shocks the conscience" test was articulated in Rochin, where the
13
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techniques shock the conscience when dealing with terrorist suspects.
Thus, the "shocks the conscience" test becomes a hole that you can
drive a CIA extraordinary rendition jet through and once again, after
the administration's lawyers have had their go, words become
divorced from their ordinary meaning. What appears to be white is in
fact black.
THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE DETENTION
Another area where the United States has abused both IHL and
international human rights law is in connection with the right to
challenge detention. The United States correctly asserts the right to
detain combatants for the duration of hostilities. But the United States
has used an overly-broad definition of enemy combatant to include
many individuals within its power. In fact, the laws of war cover
detention without charge or trial of either combatants or civilians, but
only in the case of armed conflict between states (international armed
conflict) and as to civilians, only those who pose a serious security
risk. In NIAC, IHL does not detail the rules for the right to detain.
31
This is no accident. Fighters in NIAC do not enjoy a privilege of
belligerency that applies to members of armed forces in wars between
states. NIAC fighters are mere criminals under domestic law, and so,
rules concerning their detention fall under domestic law, tempered by
international human rights obligations. The United States recognizes
no such distinctions, let alone the fact that not everything that is
classified as part of the war on terror is governed by IHL.
After the Supreme Court in the Hamdi case expressed doubts
about both the government's definition of persons who are
detainable32 and the process used to determine who to detain, 33 the
Court held that forcibly and involuntarily pumping the stomach of a drug suspect
"shocks the conscience." 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1953).
31. The Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, which cover POWs and
civilians in IAC, respectively, devote a large number of rules to detention, including
detention without criminal charge or trial. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 19;
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 19. The only provision of the Conventions
applicable to NIAC, Common Article 3, makes no mention of detention. See First
Geneva Convention, supra note 19, art. 3; Second Geneva Convention, supra note
19, art. 3; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 19, art. 3; Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 19, art. 3.
32. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004).
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Pentagon instituted combatant status review tribunals (CSRTs) at
Guantanamo-a smoke screen designed to create a patina of due
process, in the hope that it would insulate the government from a
court-ordered remedy.
34
To further insulate this charade, the administration, which knew
exactly what it was doing, and a compliant Congress, many of whose
members arguably did not, arranged for the appearance of adequate
judicial review through the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA).35 The
DTA purports to have suspended the statutory right of habeas corpus
for detainees and instead it created an appeal procedure that limits
judicial inquiry to whether the procedures in any particular case were
consistent with the rules for CSRTs and the U.S. Constitution. 36 We
have already seen that the administration's concept of constitutional
rights applicable to detainees is essentially devoid of content. In
addition, no mention is made in the DTA of U.S. treaty obligations
under the Geneva Conventions or the prohibitions against arbitrary
detention contained in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.37 Thus, the exchange in the Guantanamo Detainee
Cases in which the detainee could not defend himself because the
tribunal could not even tell him the name of the alleged member of Al
38Qaeda with whom he is alleged to have associated, would raise no
specter of reversible error under the DTA. The Supreme Court
recently considered this sad state of affairs in Boumediene v. Bush.39
33. Id. at 537.
34. Detainees are given no meaningful opportunity to contest their designation,
which is potentially based on coerced evidence and often based on secret evidence.
In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 468 (D.D.C. 2005). Such
evidence is not only unavailable to the detainee, but may also be unknown to the
hearing officers. For example, one detainee was denied access to the name of the Al
Qaeda member he was allegedly associated with, because the hearing officer did not
even know the name. Id. at 469 ("Detainee: Give me his name. Tribunal President: I
do not know.").
35. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-06, 119
Stat. 2680, 2739-45 (2005), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/
T?&report=hr359&dbname= 109&.
36. Id. § 1005, 119 Stat. at 2740-44.
37. See id.
38. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
39. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). The Court held in this case
that the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus extends to a non-citizen, held
beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States in a secure military prison over
2008]
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THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
Let us also talk about trials of detainees. You have probably
already heard of the many ways that trials under the Military
Commissions Act (MCA) 4° are unfair, including the possible use of
secret evidence, torture-based evidence, non-confrontable hearsay,
and the plain fact that the entire process is not independent, but highly
tainted by political and command influence. Colonel Morris Davis, the
former Chief Prosecutor and former supporter of military
commissions, explained that in September 2006, Deputy Defense
Secretary Gordon England discussed with him the "strategic political
value" in charging some of the prisoners before the midterm
elections.41 "Similarly, in January 2007, Pentagon General Counsel
William J. Haynes II ... telephoned Davis to prod him to charge
David Hicks, apparently as a political accommodation to the
Australian Prime Minister." 42 However, "[e]ven after Haynes was
advised that this interference was improper, he again called Davis,
suggesting that he charge other prisoners at the same time to avoid the
impression that the charges were 'a political solution to the Hicks
case.' 43 But let me concentrate on something else.
Omar Khadr, detained when he was fifteen, and who now is
twenty-one after six years in Guantanamo, stands charged with murder
and attempted murder in violation of the laws of war, conspiracy,
material support for terrorism, and spying. In Hamdan, the Supreme
Court expressed its doubts about conspiracy as a war crime.44 Material
support and spying are also not war crimes. 45 They can be
which the government has exclusive plenary control. Id. at 2262.
40. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(2006).
41. Josh White, From Chief Prosecutor to Critic at Guantanamo, WASH. POST,
Apr. 29, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/04/28/AR2008042802982_pf.html; Michael Melia, Ex-
Gitmo Prosecutor Alleges Politics, USA TODAY, Apr. 28, 2008, available at
http://www.usatoday.comnews/topstories/2008-04-28-3430213876_x.htm.
42. Marc Falkoff, Politics at Guantanamo: The Former Chief Prosecutor
Speaks, JURIST LEGAL NEWS & RES., Nov. 2, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/
2007/1 1/politics-at-guantanamo-former-chief.php.
43. Id.
44. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 601-02 (2006).
45. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c) (2008).
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criminalized, and arguably have been by the MCA, but that statute
cannot be used to prosecute conduct that predates the creation of such
crimes. That is a violation of the most fundamental principle of
international law relating to criminal responsibility: the principle of
legality, in this case, as ex post facto prosecution.
Murder and attempted murder in violation of the laws of war are
war crimes.4 6 But Khadr is charged with killing a U.S. combatant and
that is not a violation of the laws of war. The United States' theory for
charging him with a war crime is that he is an "unlawful combatant."
But unprivileged belligerency is not a violation of the laws of war. It
is merely a disqualifier for POW status in international armed conflict.
While such behavior can be criminalized in domestic law, it has not
been criminalized, and even if it were, its application would also need
to comply with ex post facto prohibitions.
What do the Geneva Conventions say about trials? Among other
provisions, CA 3 requires adherence to "judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 4 7 In fact, in
international armed conflict subjecting a detainee to an unfair trial
falls into the most severe category of war crimes: grave breaches.
48
That fact has not been lost on the drafters of the MCA. Like a child
that denies stealing any cookies even before you had any reason to
suspect him, the MCA defensively states as follows:
Sec. 948b. Military commissions generally
(f) Status of Commissions Under Common Article 3.-A military
commission established under this chapter is a regularly constituted
court, affording all the necessary "judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples" for purposes of
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
46. Id. § 2441(d)(1)(D).
47. First Geneva Convention, supra note 19, art. 3; Second Geneva
Convention, supra note 19, art. 3; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 19, art. 3;
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 19, art. 3.
48. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 19, art. 130 ("Grave breaches.
[include] willfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular
trial .... ); Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 19, art. 147 ("Grave
breaches ... [include] willfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and
regular trial ... ").
2008]
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(g) Geneva Conventions Not Establishing Source of Rights.-No
alien unlawful enemy combatant subject to trial by military
commission under this chapter may invoke the Geneva
Conventions as a source of rights.
Sec. 950p. Statement of substantive offenses
(a) Purpose.-The provisions of this subchapter codify offenses
that have traditionally been triable by military commissions. This
chapter does not establish new crimes that did not exist before its
enactment, but rather codifies those crimes for trial by military
commission.
(b) Effect.-Because the provisions of this subchapter (including
provisions that incorporate definitions in other provisions of law)
are declarative of existing law, they do not preclude trial for crimes
that occurred before the date of the enactment of this chapter.
49
Just as the United States seems to believe saying "we don't
torture" proves that we do not torture, the MCA "proves" that military
commissions under the MCA comply with the requirements of CA 3
and the crimes subject to Military Commission trials are long-standing
violations of the laws of war because the MCA says so. But just in
case that tactic fails, the MCA also prohibits detainees from asserting
their rights under the Geneva Conventions!
In addition to creating military commissions to try "unlawful
enemy combatants," the MCA amends the U.S. War Crimes Act
(WCA).5 ° The old WCA included the crime of violating CA 3: "(c)
Definition. As used in this section the term 'war crime' means any
conduct... (3) which constitutes a violation of common Article 3 of
the international conventions signed at Geneva, 12 August
1949.... " But, consider what the MCA did to the WCA:
(b) Revision to War Crimes Offense Under Federal Criminal Code.
(1) In general.-Section 2441 of title 18, United States Code, is
amended-
(A) in subsection (c), by striking paragraph (3) and inserting the
following new paragraph (3): "(3) which constitutes a grave breach
49. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3, 120 Stat.
2600, 2602, 2624 (2006).
50. Id. § 6, 120 Stat. at 2633.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(3) (2008) (amended 2006).
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of common Article 3 (as defined in subsection (d)) when committed
in the context of and in association with an armed conflict not of an
international character; or"; and
(B) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
(d) Common Article 3 Violations.
(1) Prohibited Conduct.-In subsection (c)(3), the term "grave
breach of common Article 3" means any conduct (such conduct
constituting a grave breach of common Article 3 of the international
conventions done at Geneva August 12, 1949) ....
This new subsection goes on to state "prohibited conduct"
includes: torture, cruel or inhumane treatment, biological experiments,
murder, mutilation or maiming, intentionally causing serious bodily
injury, rape, sexual assault or abuse, and taking hostages.53
In a nutshell, the MCA repealed the WCA's blanket prohibition of
CA 3 violations and replaced it with a laundry list of "grave breaches"
of CA 3. One purpose and effect of this change was to remove the CA
3 crime "passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples., 54 Why? Could it be because that
crime is precisely what the United States fears it is committing by
holding military commission trials pursuant to the MCA? This, too, is
supported by a bizarre and defensive assertion that the MCA satisfies
Geneva Convention obligations to criminalize the conduct prohibited
by the MCA.55 And in the event the victim of a violation should be
52. § 6, 120 Stat. at 2633.
53. Id. at 2633-34.
54. First Geneva Convention, supra note 19, art. 3; Second Geneva
Convention, supra note 19, art. 3; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 19, art. 3;
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 19, art. 3.
55. What the MCA should have been able to say, but obviously could not
because it would have been false, is that it criminalizes conduct the Geneva
Conventions require a party to criminalize. Instead, it gives the appearance of
satisfying that obligation by suggesting the MCA criminalizes "grave breaches" of
CA 3, as required by Article 129 of the Third Geneva Convention:
Sec. 6. Implementation of Treaty Obligations. (a) Implementation of
Treaty Obligations ... (2) Prohibition on grave breaches.-The provisions
of section 2441 of title 18, United States Code, as amended by this section,
fully satisfy the obligation under Article 129 of the Third Geneva
2008]
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thinking about suing for habeas corpus relief or other relief in
connection with their treatment, detention, or trial:
Sec. 5. Treaty Obligations Not Establishing Grounds for Certain
Claims.
(a) In General.-No person may invoke the Geneva Conventions or
any protocols thereto in any habeas corpus or other civil action or
proceeding to which the United States, or a current or former
officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of
the United States is a party as a source of rights in any court of the
United States or its States or territories.
56
CONCLUSION
57
Humanitarian law, human rights law, and the humanitarian
purposes they are meant to serve have suffered since 9/11. The cause
of this suffering can largely be laid to another irony. While the Nazis,
Pol Pot, Slobodan Milosevic, and the Janjaweed may have the blood
of millions on their hands, their brutality actually helped promote,
crystallize, and expand the reach of human rights and humanitarian
law, with the United States leading the charge. Their atrocities
encouraged the establishment of new treaties, monitoring
mechanisms, judicial bodies, and jurisprudence-an expanding web of
international human rights protection and accountability.
Convention for the United States to provide effective penal sanctions for
grave breaches which are encompassed in common Article 3 in the context
of an armed conflict not of an international character. No foreign or
international source of law shall supply a basis for a rule of decision in the
courts of the United States in interpreting the prohibitions enumerated in
subsection (d) of such section 2441.
§ 6, 120 Stat. at 2632. But Article 129 has no application to "armed conflict not of
an international character" and CA 3 does not encompass, let alone mention, any
grave breaches. This sleight of hand was evidently intended by the drafters to mask
the fact that the former WCA did criminalize violations of CA 3, generally, while
these amendments removed from the WCA certain CA 3 violations that the
Americans were possibly committing.
56. Id. § 5, at 2631.
57. Portions of Conclusion reprinted with permission from the GERMAN LAW
JOURNAL.
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The United States is, both thankfully and regrettably, different.
Thankfully, it has no Janjaweed, no Milosevic, no Pol Pot. And
America takes pride in its adherence to the rule of law-but
regrettably, not so much as to obey it. Rather, the lawyers serving the
American leadership have constructed a house of cards in a Potemkin
village of legalisms to convince Americans, if not themselves, that
"enhanced interrogation techniques," "extraordinary rendition," secret
detention, military commission trials, and the acceptance of
"diplomatic assurances" from brutal states that they will not torture
people America sends there to be detained and interrogated are
perfectly consistent, thank you, with America's international legal
obligations. And though the "torture memos," which counseled how
the President can execute his constitutional duties by violating the
Constitution have been rescinded (because they were leaked) secret
memos continue to lurk. Attorney General Mukasey's continued
inability to say that waterboarding is torture is a virtual reprise of the
Yoo/Bybee standard that is no standard. 58 Talk about lawfare!
59
There is one respect in which, contrary to Mencken's admonition,
the template for what the United States should do is simple, clear, and
right. It is the Golden Rule: that we should do unto others as we would
58. See supra note 4.
59. The term "lawfare" has been used to criticize the invocation of legal
mechanisms to assert rights relating to detention, treatment, and trial. See, e.g.,
David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Opinion, Lawfare, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2007,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI17220137149816987.html ("The term
'lawfare' describes the growing use of international law claims, usually factually or
legally meritless, as a tool of war."); John Yoo, Terror Watch: Terror Suspects Are
Waging "Lawfare" on U.S. (Jan. 18, 2008), available at
http://asinthedaysofnoah.blogspot.com/2008/0 l/terror-watchterror-suspects-are-
waging.html ("'Lawfare' has become another dimension of warfare."). These critics
seem to posit that while the administration can and must assert the law in defense of
its practices, others who do so thereby give aid and comfort to the enemy. They also
assume that any legal challenge to practices that the administration considers to be
in the context of the war on terror is lawfare, regardless of whether or not the
specific case arises in a situation of armed conflict. A more nuanced analysis of the
concept is offered by Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.
See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Deputy Judge Advocate Gen., U.S. Air Force, Keynote
Address at the Field of National Security Law Conference of the American Bar
Association: Lawfare and Warfare (Nov. 16, 2008), available at
http://www.cspanarchives.org/library/index.php?main-page=product-videoinfo&p
roductsid =202362-3.
20081
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have others do unto us. In fact, no one has ever said it more succinctly
than my mentor, Columbia Law Professor Lou Henkin. The purpose
of human rights law, he taught me, is to protect and promote human
dignity. The governments, including the United States, that
laboriously negotiated the details, including the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights60 and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 61 surely understood that they were enhancing human
security by establishing principles and rules to protect human dignity
and liberty.
In regards to humanitarian law, its drafters also understood that,
so long as war could not be abolished, it must be made as humane as
possible, while preserving the right of states to use force in defense of
their essential national interests. The organizing principle of IHL-the
principle of distinction (combatants may be targeted, civilians who
take no part in hostilities may not)-is at least as old as the chivalric
codes of the Middle Ages.62 Christian theologians, including St.
Augustine and Thomas Aquinas counseled that imposition of
unnecessary suffering feeds the cycle of violence. 63 In the eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, scholars and philosophers including
Vattel, Rousseau, and Kant advocated these principles. 64 These
concepts were not borne of pure charity toward the enemy, but rather,
out of an expectation of reciprocity and of expedience in the service of
national security. With this in mind, the international community
began codifying laws of war a century and a half ago. In doing so,
they also hit upon the notion of the famous Maartens Clause contained
in the Preamble to the 1907 Hague Convention, which established that
international humanitarian law could be based on customary as well as
codified law:
60. G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
61. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
62. David Bosco, Moral Principle vs. Military Necessity, AM. SCHOLAR,
Winter 2008, available at http://www.theamericanscholar.org/wi08/codes-
bosco.html.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the
high contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases
not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants
and belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the
principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity,
and dictates of the public conscience.
65
There is a straight line from the Maartens Clause to the
observation in the International Committee of the Red Cross's
respected Commentary to the Geneva Conventions "that the
Conventions deal with superior interests-the safeguarding of the
lives and dignity of human beings ... ,66 It is in the service of these
"superior interests" that the application and rules of the laws of armed
conflict must be interpreted.
The theme of good faith in interpretation of treaties in accordance
with their purposes runs from the Vienna Conventions67 to the recent
U.S. Counterinsurgency Manuals' 68 accompanying Rule of Law
Handbook:
in light of the need to establish legitimacy of the rule of law among
the host nation's populace, conduct by U.S. forces that would be
questionable under any mainstream interpretation of international
human rights law is unlikely to have a place in rule of law
operations.
69
This is wise counsel, consistent with a tradition of construing
international human rights and humanitarian law obligations in the
65. 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Preamble (reprinted in ADAM ROBERTS & RJCHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON
THE LAWS OF WAR 70 (3d ed. 2000)).
66. Jean S. Pictet, Introduction to COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 12 (1952).
67. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 ("'Pacta sunt servanda': Every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.").
68. U.S. ARMY AND MARINE CORPS, COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL
(U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-24; Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-
33.5) (2007)).
69. RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE FOR JUDGE
ADVOCATES (Vasilios Tasikas, Thomas B. Nachbar & Charles R. Oleszycki, eds.,
2007).
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light most favorable to the interests of human dignity, and thus,
human security.
With these reminders of the purposes of human rights and
humanitarian law in mind, and further, considering the interpretive
bias toward protection of individual rights and dignity that they are
meant to suggest, it is obvious that the effort to combat terrorism
would be well served by the United States' return to mainstream
concepts of applicable international law. Here are three things that the
United States can do to that end:
e For people detained outside of armed conflict: Stop using the
term "combatant" and stop asserting application of IHL. Reform
legal procedures so that the power to detain, the right to challenge
detention, and trial procedures comport with the requirements of
international human rights law, including the right to habeas corpus.
* For people detained in international armed conflict: Reform
legal procedures so that entitlement to POW status and civilian
status might be determined in appropriate cases and so that trial
procedures are consistent with applicable requirements of IHL.
Restrict the use of the term "combatant" to persons entitled to POW
status.
0 For people detained in non-international armed conflict:
Reform legal procedures so that the power to detain, the right to
challenge detention, and trial procedures comport with the
requirements of applicable IHL and international human rights law,
including the right to habeas corpus. Stop using the term
"combatant" to describe persons in this category.
We, at Human Rights First, are in the process of drafting detailed
"Blueprints" for the next administration, spelling out step-by-step
ways for the United States to reform its detainee laws and practices.
These Blueprints include practical guidelines to put an end to torture,
ill-treatment, arbitrary detention, and unfair trials and thereby, return
the United States to the fold of nations that respect and implement
their international legal obligations. 70 By honoring its international
humanitarian law and human rights law commitments, the United
States will not only improve its tarnished reputation in the realm of
human rights, it will also thereby complement its efforts to improve
national security and re-establish its ability to advocate for respect for
the rule of law elsewhere.
70. These Blueprints are available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org.
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